Where is the war going? Russia struggles to win back initiative as Ukraine grows

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The war in Ukraine is far from over. The country is restoring areas and self-esteem too. Russia does not rule out pressing the nuclear button if it feels seriously threatened

The pendulum of the war seems to have changed direction with Ukraine’s September offensive on the Kharkov sector. The Kiev government has managed to regain some of the territory lost at the start of the war. Though at a slower pace, the offensive continues, questioning the firmness of Russian control over the Donbas territories it captured from Ukraine in 2014.

Ukraine’s change of position is fueling expectations of a final and complete victory over Russia, which could see itself expelled from the territories it has occupied since 2014. Will Ukraine win the war? The answer to this question depends in large part on what “winning the war” means for Ukraine, although today it is as imprecise as it is premature to think that Russia is on the brink of defeat – something that is possible.

Ukraine’s military capabilities have made extraordinary progress since the beginning of the war, yes, thanks to the combat experience gained in these months, but above all thanks to the aid received from the West in the form of equipment, intelligence, training, planning capacity and resources for command and control. Ukraine is becoming more capable and daring every day, as evidenced by the way the offensive has been prepared and executed.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian operation is limited in scope. We are not faced with an operational-level offensive covering the entire Russian front that could cause the collapse and total defeat of Russia. Today – this may change in the future – Ukraine does not seem to have the capacity to plan and execute such a large-scale operation, let alone support it.

Russia, although it has suffered losses and damage to its units’ combat morale which is difficult to quantify, is not on the brink of collapse, although the nature of the war means that this possibility cannot be ruled out.

Moscow starts taking measures after the first knockout to contain Ukrainian penetration and restore the pre-offensive situation. The announcement of the decree for the partial mobilization of three hundred thousand reservists and, above all, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, are facts that speak eloquently about the damage the offensive has caused to Russia, to the combat morale of its units and, I felt, to the will of the Russian public to resist.

The possibility of Russia crossing the nuclear threshold cannot simply be ignored, especially if the annexation of the Donetsk and Lugansk territories to Russia, which is behind the announced referendums in the two territories, were to be completed.

Without going so extreme, Russia can respond by bolstering units on the Ukrainian front—which it must weigh carefully so as not to break its domestic front—intensifying the use of firepower on targets of tactical and strategic value, and remaining steadfast. in the hope that the arrival of winter will tip the balance in your favor again. Still, it doesn’t seem logical to expect Russia to rebuild its capabilities to reverse the current trend, recapture newly lost territory and extend control over Ukraine even further west.

Recently, President Zelensky expressed his ambition to reclaim all the territories Russia has taken from him since 2014. Such a pursuit is legitimate, understandable and in keeping with respect for the international order, which cannot give a charter to a situation achieved through the illegitimate use of force. If that is the strategic goal set by the president, it is far from being achieved, neither militarily nor through possible negotiations that seem distant due to a lack of will on the part of the parties.

What if that goal was attainable? Should the West support Ukraine’s efforts to achieve this? This creates a dilemma between the desirable and the practical. The full restoration of its territorial integrity is a matter of law, for Ukraine and for the entire international community.

The problem is that attempting to do so could lead to an escalation of the Russian response in the terms Putin used in his threat, which could ultimately drag the West into the conflict, with unforeseen consequences. Moreover, a Russian defeat in these terms could topple Putin’s regime without catching a glimpse of a deputy with whom the West could come to an agreement, and who could take an even more opposite position to the West than that of Putin, blocking the possibility of cooperation. That’s not entirely helpful if you see China as the real medium-term challenge to global security.

With all moral reservations, the pragmatic avenue of negotiation must be explored if one strives for a stable and acceptable peace for both parties. This solution seems far away; Ukraine rejects it because it thinks that the recovery of all the lost territory is not a chimera; Russia, because it needs to regain the initiative and because it believes that the hitherto occupied territory does not meet its security needs, nor does it justify its option for war. It will not be achieved without an external stimulus that moves the contenders to the negotiating table.

This article was published in ‘The conversation’.

Source: La Verdad

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