The secessionist Moldovan region of Transnistria, bordering Ukraine and with a significant pro-Russian population, could be part of the New Russia plans conceived by Vladimir Putin
Putin’s continued aggression against Ukraine has put the secessionist region of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova in the spotlight. This territorial strip beyond the Dniester covers about 12% of the Moldavian territory and 10% of the population, about 350,000 inhabitants divided into three thirds (Moldovians-Romanians, Ukrainians and Russians).
In the month of September 1990, in the context of nationalist demands in the various republics of the Soviet Union, some groups led by the Russian minority living in the Moldavian region between the left bank of the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border were , allied with the local Soviet nomenklatura, declared their independence from Moldova.
The argument advanced was the eventual reunification of this republic with Romania – claimed by the Popular Front of Moldova – to undo the effects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 on Bessarabia and its integration and ethno-linguistic differentiation within the USSR. to make. A similar movement took place in parallel in the five districts of southern Moldova, with an ethnic Gagauze majority.
Between March and July 1992, the war phase of the confrontation between the Moldovan authorities and the Transnistrians, supported by the XIV Russian army, which was based in the region despite the independence of Moldova, took place.
Since the Istanbul Agreement of 21 July 1992, which ended the military phase, Transnistria has turned into a frozen conflict and a de facto state.
A whole succession of formats to try to find a political-diplomatic solution to it has failed, essentially due to the obstruction of Russia, which is interested in maintaining the current status quo that is geopolitically favorable to its interests. .
The conversion of the Russian military contingent into peacekeeping forces in the enclave was intended to seek legal cover for a presence that violates the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent state like Moldova.
However, Russia did not recognize the independence declared by the secession authorities in 2006, after holding an illegal referendum in which the majority approved it (97%).
Until now, Moscow has been more in favor of a confederal solution, such as the one in the Kozak memorandum (proposed in 2003, not accepted by the Chisinau authorities because of the veto power granted to Transnistria in the approval of key decisions of the Moldovan state.
The long-standing paralysis of the 5+2 negotiating format (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, OSCE, with the EU and the United States as observers) coincided with the departure from power of the Moldovan communists and the formation of pro-Western governments (EU and NATO), although Moldova is a neutralized state (Art. 11, 1994 Constitution) The consequences of Euromaidan in Ukraine, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in the eastern districts of Donbas – maintained since with more than 11,000 dead in 2021 – led to Moldova’s association agreement with the EU and the resulting deterioration in relations with Russia and, in parallel, with Transnistria. In addition to the cooperation with Ukraine in the field of border control, which, thanks to the help of the EU EUBAM mission, has intensified in a very remarkable way.
In 2014, this project, Novorossiya (New Russia), developed by the Russian military leadership with some representatives of the neo-imperialist ultra-nationalism closest to the Kremlin, gained some notoriety.
The independence movement in Donetsk and Lugansk was promoted by Putin, who explained in April 2014 that these regions — including Crimea and Odessa — had been part of the Tsarist Empire since the 18th century. However, with the signing of the Minsk I and II Agreements in 2014 and 2015, Novorossiya’s recreation was watered down.
What has changed? In the context of the ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine since February 24, the concentration of Russian military operations in the eastern districts and in the south of Ukraine would make it possible to control the entire south of the republic – with Crimea already in its grip. power –, access from the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and to short-circuit this outlet to Ukraine if Moscow’s intervention plan extended to Odessa and eventually became territorially linked to Transnistria.
In addition to the project’s geostrategic importance, which would definitively subject Ukraine and Moldova to their potential claims to join NATO and the EU, it would recreate the Russian imperialist imagination with control over the founding Slavic core (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). -Russia) and it would strengthen its western borders and turn the entire territorial strip into a sort of security buffer.
The conversion of Transnistria into a second version of Crimea is feasible. Any international recognition of its independence by Moscow would unite the separatist enclave with other cases in the former Soviet space, such as South Ossetia or Abkhazia in Georgia and the aforementioned Crimea and the Donetsk and Lugansk districts of Donbas, located on the outskirts. . legal parameters in the international legal order.
However, the conversion of Transnistria into a de iure state would bring no additional benefits to Russia over the situation maintained for three decades, although it would entail significant costs.
The possibility of launching an attack on Ukraine from Transnistria by Russian and Transnistrian contingents is unlikely, given that we are talking about a total of some 6,000 human troops and weapons, many of which date from the Soviet period.
However, the false flag operations that could be behind the recent attacks in Maiak or Parcani could accelerate the plan the Kremlin has devised for this enclave.
Moldova’s extreme energy dependence on Russian natural gas and oil makes it impossible to imagine any kind of military agitation in Transnistria by President Maia Sandu. In addition, the area is in a very complex context due to the reception of a large contingent of Ukrainian refugees.
The option to take Odessa militarily is very risky, but it would be the only option to connect Russian positions territorially with Transnistria and encircle all borders with Russian military positions (including Belarus).
If the more than two months of military aggression against Ukraine show us anything, it’s that we must be prepared for the unforeseen, such as recreating Putin’s New Russia project.
This article was published in ‘Het Gesprek’.
Source: La Verdad
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