May 9 this year has not been “Victory Day” as Russian president has little to boast of after 74 days of aggression against Ukraine
Thousands of Russians gathered in Moscow’s Red Square on May 9 for the annual celebration of Victory Day, a highly symbolic commemoration of the defeat of Nazism in World War II.
But there is broad consensus around the world that the Russian military has so far failed to achieve the strategic territorial successes that would have enabled Vladimir Putin to achieve Moscow’s war goals in time for the event. And so, deprived of the chance to declare his own victory in Ukraine, Putin repeated only one version of his worn-out diatribe against NATO and the West in his Red Square speech.
But Russia’s relapse started much earlier. After Moscow’s failure in the early days and weeks of the invasion to take Kiev and force Ukraine’s surrender, in April Moscow announced somewhat more modest, but not necessarily achievable, goals for the second phase of its aggression against Ukraine. .
In the course of this second phase of the war, Russia hopes to gain full control over Donbas and southern Ukraine, including Odessa, and to consolidate a land corridor to Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria.
This strategy is reminiscent of the New Russia project that was briefly pushed by the Kremlin in 2014 to justify Russia’s territorial claims to southern Ukraine and Crimea. It is based on the historically questionable claim that these areas, conquered by the Tsarist Russian Empire in several 18th-century wars with the Ottoman Empire, have always been Russian and should therefore be part of present-day Russia.
Little progress has been made so far on this point. Russia initially won some territorial victories north of Lugansk, but has fallen back around Kharkov. Similarly – and also from the early days of the invasion – Russia took over much of the Kherson region, but had to halt plans to hold a referendum there, initially scheduled for April 27, and is grappling with the introduction of the Russian ruble.
Also, about half of the Zaporizhzhya region, including the capital from which it owes its name, remains in Ukrainian hands. Russian forces also failed to advance towards Mykolaiv, the capital of the neighboring region of the same name, and were effectively driven from this strategic city by a Ukrainian counter-offensive.
The Kremlin has also failed to take all of Mariupol, where Ukrainian defenders continue to thwart Russian efforts amid a humanitarian disaster.
Although the Russian offensive in eastern and southern Ukraine has stalled, it is not over. Russian forces have made little progress around Izium and Popasna since war efforts were shifted to Donbas, and the danger remains that Ukrainian forces will be surrounded in government-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Lugansk regions.
But Russia’s claims have entailed significant costs in terms of personnel and equipment. Both are becoming increasingly difficult to replace due to a lack of available combat-ready troops and Western sanctions, which complicate the production and repair of new equipment.
But the continuation of heavy fighting in Donbas and long-range strikes on major population centers and critical infrastructure in central and western Ukraine indicate that Moscow has significant combat capabilities and is ready to deploy them.
Ukraine’s highly determined and successful defense efforts, bolstered by Western military aid to Kiev and the simultaneous increase in economic pressure on Moscow, raise the question of how long Russia will invest in an unjustified aggression that is increasingly difficult to sustain and tangible signs of progress.
As time goes by, a battle of attrition becomes more and more likely. As Russia goes on the defensive, it will entrench itself firmly in the areas it owns by then and, in a reversal of the current situation, Ukraine will have a hard time pushing back Russian forces much further.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s western allies have pushed for increasingly ambitious war goals. Among them, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Russia must be weakened “to the point where it can’t do the kinds of things it did by invading Ukraine.” For her part, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has demanded that Russia be completely expelled from Ukraine.
This goes beyond Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s minimum goals in all negotiations: for Russia to withdraw from the front lines as they existed before the start of the invasion on February 24, 2022.
But Zelensky also made it clear that a precondition for Ukraine to negotiate was the successful evacuation of civilians (which has now been completed) and fighters from the besieged Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol.
At this time, there is no indication that the war will end with anything other than a negotiated settlement. To assume otherwise would be to overestimate the chances of driving Russia out of Ukraine and underestimate the human and material costs and timeframe for doing so. In addition, after nearly three months of war, both sides are exhausted and may be looking forward to a break from the intense fighting to rest, regroup and resupply their troops.
However this ceasefire turns out, it would also create an opportunity for negotiations, not least because further changes to the status quo reached thus far would only be possible at a cost that is likely unbearable.
The United Nations’ growing involvement in mediation efforts and the recent UN Security Council presidential statement, also supported by Russia, indicate that a return to negotiations is possible in the near future.
Since a situation of no war and no peace can arise, similar to what happened in 2014-2015, the West must remember the fateful Minsk agreement of February 2015. New negotiations with Russia need not and should not now be accompanied by concessions that legitimize Putin’s aggression.
Moscow must fail in Ukraine and in a visible way to discourage future adventurism. But for that to happen, negotiations must take place, and they won’t even begin as long as one side continues to believe that it can win on the battlefield. Even realizing that this is not possible, both sides will try to improve their positions on the ground before the war comes to a stalemate.
That is why the West must further increase the pressure on Russia. This means, for example, applying the sixth EU sanctions package and then extending it in line with the G7 statement of 8 May 2022.
At the same time, military support to Ukraine should be continued and expanded. Weakening Russia’s war effort and strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities will be key to minimizing Kiev’s losses – both territorial and otherwise – and strengthening its position in future negotiations.
This article was published in ‘Het Gesprek’.
Source: La Verdad
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